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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I present a new account of Richard Rorty’s interpretation of Michel 
Foucault, which demonstrates that in the course of his career, Rorty presented several diverse 
(often mutually exclusive) criticisms of Foucault’s political thought.  These give different inter-
pretations of what he took to be the flaws of that thought, but also provide different expla-
nations as to the sources of these flaws.  I argue that Rorty’s specific criticisms can be divided 
into two overall groups. Sometimes he saw Foucault’s rejection of bourgeois democracies and 
bourgeois utopias as a specific case of his general critique regarding the structures of social life 
as inherently oppressive.  At other times he seemed to attribute to Foucault a view that—while 
not all forms of social life are inherently oppressive—bourgeois democracies certainly are, in a 
very specific and radical way.  In conclusion I show that Rorty’s interpretation of Foucault 
should be understood in the context of his approach toward the ‘American Cultural Left.’  
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I 
It is a common feature of academic industries devoted to studying a particular thinker that 
due to their high specialization and hermeticity (each has its own baroque, complex hierarchy, 
discursive codes, and—most of all—an overwhelmingly comprehensive and incessantly shif-
ting canon of secondary literature) they remain almost perfectly parallel worlds.  Even when 
there is a significant potential for interaction, dialogue, or collision between them (for instance, 
because great thinker x discussed great thinker y), it is often channeled into sterile carping, 
within each industry, about how x misread y, or vice versa; an exercise that is at once as easy 
as it is grotesque.  Easy, because virtually every thinker capable of engendering an industry is 
a strong reader for whom the interpretive standards of the sort celebrated by pedantic spe-
cialists simply do not exist.  Grotesque, because such fulminations must themselves be based 
on a misreading of the incriminated misreader, since the fulminators are generally too busy 
exploring the work of their hero or heroine to gain sufficient knowledge of anything else.   
While not claiming that the relationship between Foucault and Rorty studies can be 
reduced entirely to this particular pattern, I would like to present in this paper a new account 
of how Rorty understood Michel Foucault, which, I hope, can be of use to Foucault specialists.   
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If not in the sense of facilitating a dialogue between these fields of study, then by enriching 
knowledge about Foucault’s reception in America.  What I consider to be the novelty of my ac-
count, lies mainly in showing that in the course of his career, Rorty presented several diverse, 
some of them mutually exclusive, criticisms of Foucault’s political thought, in the sense that 
not only did he differently interpret what he took to be the latter’s flaws, but also provided 
different explanations as to the sources of these flaws.  Admittedly, many of these criticisms 
may seem baffling or even outrageous to a majority of readers.  Apart from a few remarks in 
the conclusion, however, I am going to remain agnostic with regard to the accuracy of Rorty’s 
interpretations and to the validity of his arguments.1  Moreover, since I am convinced that it 
does ‚matter who’s speaking,‛2 and that the ambiguous entity: ‘the oeuvre’ is important; I 
shall try to read Rorty’s respective views through the prism of his intellectual background and 
situate them in the general context of his thought.   
 
II 
Before I turn to the main subject of the paper, I must mention that Rorty’s treatment of Fou-
cault was—to grossly understate things—not uniformly critical.3  In fact, he did not hesitate to 
praise Foucault as a ‚remarkable man‛ of great ‚imagination,‛4 who was able to consistently 
follow Nietzsche’s imperative of ‚becoming who one is,‛5 not to mention that he portrayed 
him as an ‚impressive‛ (if slightly ‚overwrought‛6) ‚intellectual figure,‛7 a fellow anti-
dualist,8 anti-Platonist,9 anti-representationalist,10 anti-essentialist,11 and social constructivist.12  
                                                 
1 This is also the reason why, in the present paper, quotations from Rorty’s works drastically outnumber 
citations from Foucault. For some other accounts of Rorty’s critique of Foucault (some of them defending the 
latter against the former) see, for instance, Joan M. Reynolds, ‚‘Pragmatic Humanism’ in Foucault’s Later 
Work,‛ Canadian Journal of Political Science, Revue canadienne de science politique, 37, no. 4 (Dec., 2004): 951-977; 
James D. Marshall, ‚On What We May Hope: Rorty on Dewey and Foucault,‛ Studies in Philosophy and Edu-
cation, 13, nos. 3-4 (1994): 307-323; Barry Allen, ‚After Knowledge and Liberty: Foucault and the New Prag-
matism,‛ in Carlos G. Prado (ed.), Foucault’s Legacy (London: Continuum, 2009); David L. Hall, Richard Rorty: 
Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism (New York: SUNY Press, 1994), 154-60; Christopher J. Voparil, Richard 
Rorty: Politics and Vision (Langham, MD:  Rowman & Littlefield Press, 2006), 125-7; and Marek Kwiek, Rorty’s 
Elective Affinities: The New Pragmatism and Postmodern Thought (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, 
1996), 211-237. 
2 See Michel Foucault, ‚What is an Author,‛ in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Inter-
views, edited, with an introduction, by Donald F. Bouchard; translated from the French by Donald F. Bou-
chard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 138. 
3 As Barry Allen emphasizes, Rorty ‚always begins with something to admire *in Foucault+.‛ (Allen, ‚After 
Knowledge and Liberty,‛ 79) 
4 Richard Rorty, Take Care of Freedom and Truth Will Take Care of Itself: Interviews with Richard Rorty, edited and 
with an introduction by Eduardo Mendieta (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 40. 
5 See Richard Rorty, ‚Is ‘Cultural Recognition’ a Useful Concept for Leftist Politics?,‛ Critical Horizons, 1, no. 
1 (2000), 15. 
6 Richard Rorty, ‚Foucault and Epistemology,‛ in David Couzens Hoy (ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader (Ox-
ford-New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 45.  
7 Josefina Ayerza with Richard Rorty, ‚North Atlantic Thinking,‛ Lacan.com [originally published in Flash Art 
(Nov/Dec, 1993)+. <http://www.lacan.com/perfume/rorty.htm> Cf. also the following remark by Rorty: ‚I 
think he [i.e., Foucault]’s inspired a lot of very creative work, particularly at Berkeley. He’s created a whole 
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To nuance this picture chronologically, when in the late 1970s and early 1980s, his re-
search interest was mainly in epistemology and its history, and thus in Foucault’s pre-1968 
work,13 Rorty used to advertize the latter as somebody who was helpful in ‚fleshing out‛ 
Kuhn’s conception of science14 and in supplying contemporary historicist, or post-Hegelian, 
critics of theory of knowledge with sufficient a dose of irony to guard them against their own 
inclinations toward Whiggishness.15  These elements of Foucault’s thought, as Rorty revealed 
in his philosophical autobiography ‚Trotsky and Wild Orchids,‛ had even contributed to ‚the 
small epiphany,‛ without which, we may suppose, Rorty’s opus magnum—Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature—would not have come into being at all.16 
                                                                                                                                                                  
school there through other historians, through anthropologists; the literary critics are all more or less Fou-
caultians—that’s quite a remarkable intellectual event.‛ (Ibid.) 
8 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin Books 1999), 47. 
9 Ibid., xix-xx. 
10 See Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 15; and Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1982), 86. 
11 Richard Rorty, ‚Response to Kate Soper,‛ in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson (eds.), Richard 
Rorty: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 132. 
12 See Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 31, 35; and Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, 49. Cf. Richard Rorty, Truth 
and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8. 
13 Cf. Rorty’s remarks on dividing Foucault’s work into the pre- and post-1968 period in ‚Beyond Nietzsche 
and Marx,‛ London Review of Books, 3, no. 3 (19 February, 1981), 3-4; pagination refers to the online edition of 
the article to be found at <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v03/n03/rort01_.html>.   
14 ‚Wittgenstein’s insistence that one cannot get outside language-games so as to compare our language with 
reality was used by Kuhn and others to construct a picture of science as a matter of working with (and using 
up) tools, rather than of seeing reality more clearly.  Such Wittgensteinian criticisms of Enlightenment no-
tions of ‘truth’ and ‘science’ will seem more paradox-mongering, however, as long as we retain the 19th-
century picture of continuous, asymptotic, scientific progress—of knowledge as evolving and spreading in a 
continuously rational way.  Foucault’s histories helped us see the discontinuities, the sudden twists and 
turns.  His notion of an episteme, ‘the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from 
the false, but of what may be from what may not be characterised as scientific, and his illustrations of how 
such an apparatus can suddenly be cast aside, helps flesh out Kuhn’s notion of ‘paradigm’.‛ (Ibid.) 
15  Thanks to Foucault, contemporary historicists have realized that ‚Maybe we *i.e., the historicists+ cannot 
put together a history of thought which is both honest and continuous.  Foucault might just possibly be right 
in saying that the stories we tell about how our ancestors gradually matured into ourselves are so 
‘Whiggish’, so anachronistic, as to be worthless.‛ (Rorty, ‚Foucault and Epistemology,‛ 48)  Cf. Richard 
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 391-2. 
16 ‚About 20 years or so after I decided that the young Hegel’s willingness to stop trying for eternity, and just 
be the child of his time, was the appropriate response to disillusionment with Plato, I found myself being led 
back to Dewey.  Dewey now seemed to me a philosopher who had learned all that Hegel had to teach about 
how to eschew certainty and eternity, while immunizing himself against pantheism by taking Darwin 
seriously.  This rediscovery of Dewey coincided with my first encounter with Derrida< Derrida led me back 
to Heidegger, and I was struck by the resemblances between Dewey’s, Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s criti-
cisms of Cartesianism.  Suddenly things began to come together.  I thought I saw a way to blend a criticism 
of the Cartesian tradition with the quasi-Hegelian historicism of Michel Foucault, Ian Hacking and Alasdair 
MacIntyre.  I thought that I could fit all these into a quasi-Heideggerian story about the tensions within Pla-
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When, from the 1980s onward, Rorty’s work began to gravitate toward politics, he still 
found some aspects of Foucault’s thought praiseworthy, beginning with Foucault’s ‚debunk-
[ing]‛ of the conceptions of emancipation that rely on a ‚Rousseauistic‛ picture of the true 
human nature that hides beneath layers of apparent subjectivity shaped by socialization.17  In 
that picture, all social institutions and communal constraints must appear as ‚ex definitione 
coercive,‛ which naturally implies that the only way to realize human freedom lies in abo-
lishing such institutions and breaking down such constraints.  As Rorty argued, Foucault’s 
skepticism toward that conception resulted from his social constructivism about humanity 
which he shared with John Dewey among others18; a fact worth mentioning here, if only be-
cause one of the highest compliments Rorty could pay to any thinker was to stress their 
convergence with Dewey.19  In any event, both Dewey and Foucault—Rorty’s argument went 
on—were convinced that if one tried to peel the layers of socialization from the human self, 
one would end up empty-handed, since we are what society makes of us.  So, if there is any 
freedom available to anybody, it is available not despite, but thanks to social conventions and 
constraints.20  To put it differently, both would agree that we are basically constituted by ‚the 
meshes of power‛—and so is everything else.21  
As soon as one acquires this view, all philosophical speculations about the alleged ahis-
torical, inner core of the human self, along with political theories that are predicated on such 
speculations, appear useless or comical, or both at the same time.  Since der Lebenswelt is all 
that there is to featherless bipeds (apart from such biological trivialities that they are bipeds 
indeed),22 in solving human problems, we should turn not to philosophy, but instead to those 
discourses that are confined to a sublunar, social perspective; say, sociology, anthropology, 
novels etc.23  But that is not all.  Since power permeates everything, we cannot evaluate any-
thing solely on the basis of its being immune to or infected by power, and, a fortiori, build a 
politics around such evaluation.  Rather, we should satisfy ourselves with distinguishing be-
                                                                                                                                                                  
tonism. The result of this small epiphany was a book called Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.‛ (Rorty, 
Philosophy and Social Hope, 11-2) 
17 Rorty, ‚Beyond Nietzsche and Marx,‛ 7. 
18 Those others include, e.g., Hegel, ‚Mead, Sellars, and Habermas.‛  See Rorty, ‚Beyond Nietzsche and 
Marx,‛ 7; and Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 64. 
19 For some other similarities Rorty saw between Dewey and Foucault, see Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 
xxxi, 86.   
20 Cf. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, xlii, 208. 
21 See Rorty, ‚Beyond Nietzsche and Marx,‛ 7. Cf. Rorty, Take Care of Freedom, 22. 
22 See Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 208. 
23 ‚We don’t need philosophy for social criticism: we have economics, sociology, the novel, psychoanalysis, 
and many other ways to criticize society.  Take the very powerful critic Foucault.  His best work does not 
strike me as particularly philosophical.  The most interesting parts of his works are the details about the cul-
ture of the insane asylums, of prisons, of hospitals.  Foucault was also a great philosopher, but he made a so-
cial difference not as a philosopher, but as someone who looked at particular things harder than anybody 
else.‛ (Rorty, Take Care of Freedom, 45) 
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tween the power ‚we like‛ and the power ‚we don’t like,‛24 and do our best to ensure there is 
less of the latter and more of the former, something for which the aforementioned discourses, 
including such specimens as Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, are—says Rorty—indispen-
sable.25  
The problem with Foucault, however, and here we are approaching the gist of Rorty’s 
criticism of him, is that while he was exceptionally good at unmasking the ‚bad‛ power, he 
was quite bad at helping the ‚good‛ one flourish26; a flaw which stems mainly from his ina-
bility to detect even the faintest traces of the latter in our present democracies.  In fact, what is 
probably most striking in Foucault, for philosophers such as Habermas, Taylor, and Rorty, is 
that being a perceptive historian he was, sensitive to all kinds of ‚cunning ways‛, in which the 
process of modernization brought with it new kinds of oppression, he remained blind to the 
unquestionable advantages of that process and to their ‚compensating‛ for the negative 
consequences of it.27  This seems all the more curious if one considers the fact that it is pre-
cisely thanks to these advantages that Foucault could fashion his life in a way that was un-
dreamt of (or at least was fiercely punishable) before modernity.28  It is only thanks to them 
that he could become, as Rorty once put it, ‚the knight of autonomy.‛29  
This, however, does not exhaust the list of Foucault’s sins, for—to Rorty’s mind,—he 
not only failed significantly in analyzing the present and the past, but also failed, and failed 
even worse, at envisioning the future; something certainly no politics can do without.30  In or-
der to better grasp the latter point, let us take a look at the remark with which Rorty concludes 
his review of Herculine Barbin 
 
Foucault urges that the structures of power have made life pretty well impossible for some-
body whose sexual organs are intermediate.  So they have: but that seems like saying that 
they have made life almost impossible for somebody who is deaf and blind.  One is not 
                                                 
24 That is, power used for purposes we like and that used for purposes we dislike.  For instance, says Rorty, 
‚The power of a utopian egalitarian community to create good citizens via biopower is a good thing.‛ 
(Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, 69)   Cf. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 175. 
25 ‚Discoveries about who is being made to suffer can be left to the workings of free press, free universities, 
and enlightened public opinion—enlightened, for example, by books like Madness and Civilization and Disci-
pline and Punish, as well as those like Germinal, Black Boy, The Road to Wigan Pier, and 1984.‛ (Rorty, Contin-
gency, Irony, and Solidarity, 63-4.) 
26 See Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 175; and Rorty, Take Care of Freedom, 40. Cf. Kwiek, Rorty’s Elective 
Affinities, 212. 
27 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 63. Cf. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 195; Rorty, Truth and 
Progress, 198; and Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 7. Cf. Allen, ‚After Knowledge and Liberty,‛ 80. 
28 Richard Rorty, ‚Paroxysms and Politics,‛ in Robert Boyers and Peggy Boyers (eds.), The New Salmagundi 
Reader (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 518. 
29 Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 194. 
30 See Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 174; Rorty, ‚Beyond Nietzsche and Marx,‛ 9; Rorty, Achieving 
Our Country, 138-139.  
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going to feel the force of either remark unless one can think up some structures which 
wouldn’t have this effect.31  
 
Rorty was fond of calling such imagined structures utopias, and thus we might say that his 
objection toward Foucault is that the latter was unwilling to sketch a ‚utopia‛ ahead of us—
both in the sense of ‚liberal,‛ or ‚bourgeois,‛ utopia, which Rorty cared about the most, and 
defined as ‚just a lot more of the same kind of thing we have had a little of already,‛32 and any 
utopia whatsoever.    
These, according to Rorty, would be the main drawbacks of Foucault’s political thought, 
which, it is worth adding here, kept puzzling Rorty for many years.  So much, in fact, that he 
felt it necessary to account for them, eventually providing several different hypotheses in this 
regard, which I will try to reconstruct in the following sections of the paper and which can be 
divided into two groups, depending on which particular spin he would give to his inter-
pretation of the aforementioned drawbacks at a given moment.  For it seems that he interpre-
ted them in at least two ways.  Namely, sometimes he saw Foucault’s rejection of bourgeois 
democracies and bourgeois utopias as a specific case of his general critique of all structures of 
social life as inherently oppressive, while at other times he attributed to Foucault a view that 
while not all forms of society are inherently oppressive, bourgeois democracies certainly are 
so, and in a very specific and radical way. 
 
III 
To begin with the latter case, it must be noted that, for Rorty, there can be no logical iunctim 
between Foucault’s contempt for bourgeois liberalism33 and his aforementioned views on 
power and the self.  According to Rorty, a constructivist dissolution of the Rousseauvian con-
ception of subjectivity does not invalidate liberalism in and of itself (even if one considers as 
its key component a certain ideology of individualism).  This is so because liberalism, as prac-
tically any other political outlook for that matter, does not hinge on its philosophical justifi-
cations and is in principle ‚compatible‛ with any ontology, understood as a set of theoretical 
views on the nature of human beings and reality which can be found in philosophy books, 
including those written by Foucault.34  Even though this argument, or should I say claim, is 
not uncontroversial (some philosophers, like Kate Soper, for instance, would say it is utterly 
                                                 
31 Rorty, Beyond Nietzsche and Marx, 8.  See also Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a 
Nineteenth-Century French Hermaphrodite, introduced by Michel Foucault; translated by Richard McDougall 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).  
32 Rorty, Truth and Progress, 324. Cf. ‚Liberals in the Mill-Dewey tradition dream of a utopia in which every-
body has a chance at the things only the richer citizens of the rich North Atlantic democracies have been able 
to get—the freedom, wealth, and leisure to pursue private perfection in idiosyncratic ways.‛ That utopia is 
‚not a transfiguration but a redistribution.‛ (Ibid.) 
33 Note that Rorty ‚contrast*s+ bourgeois liberalism, the attempt to fulfill the hopes of the North Atlantic 
bourgeoisie, with philosophical liberalism, a collection of Kantian principles thought to justify us in having 
those hopes.‛ (Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 198)  In the remainder of the text, I shall be using 
terms the ‚bourgeois liberalism‛ and ‚liberalism‛ (and its derivatives) interchangeably.  
34 Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 197. Cf., e.g., Rorty, ‚Response to Kate Soper,‛ 132; and Richard Ror-
ty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),  33-4. 
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wrong35), instead of trying to expand or defend it here, let me stress that when it comes to the 
compatibility of social constructivism and liberalism in particular, it sometimes seems enough 
for Rorty to indicate that both these views were held simultaneously by George Herbert Mead 
or Dewey without contradiction.36  
The case with Foucault’s conceptions of power is even simpler, since they boil down to 
the claim that when we recognize a particular kind of power as oppressive, it is not oppressive 
because all power is intrinsically so, but rather because we have just encountered a power we 
‚don’t like,‛ and they do not tell us anything about which power to like and which not to like.  
What we seem to be left with, then, is the question why Foucault, did not ‚like‛ liberal demo-
cracies as such, to which Rorty gives three different answers.  These can loosely be called ‚so-
ciological,‛ ‚psychological, and ‚historical.‛  
In the first case, the predicate ‚sociological‛ should in fact be qualified with the adverb 
‘vulgarly’, since the explanation in question boils down to a sweeping claim that Foucault’s 
behavior is the result of following some ‚contingent French fashion.‛  In other words, (words 
that notably come from an interview, which might justify their insouciance to an extent): ‚I 
don’t see—says Rorty—what Foucault had against bourgeois liberalism, except that in the 
France of the fifties and sixties it just wasn’t respectable to be a bourgeois liberal.  I don’t think 
he has any arguments against it or anything better to suggest.‛37  As if to bolster this ‚diag-
nosis,‛ in a different place, Rorty invoked yet another French thinker who ‚hate*d+ the 
bourgeoisie more than he love[d] anyone else‛, i.e., Jean-Paul Sartre, and pointed out that both 
men had been ‚led‛ by their hatred to adopt political stances that seem dangerously irrespon-
sible, to put it euphemistically.38  What Rorty meant here is, mainly, that Foucault entertained 
‚the same sort of tolerance for Maoist bloodthirstiness as Sartre had for Stalinist terror‛: 
 
In the first interview in Power/Knowledge, Foucault out-radicals some Maoists by objecting to 
‘People’s Courts’ as perpetuating the ‘judicial and penal apparatus’ which the revolution 
must get rid of.  It all sounds much too much like a Nazi ideologue suggesting that the ad-
ministrative apparatus for carrying out the Nuremberg Laws betrays the spirit of the 
National Socialist revolution, and hinting that it would be better if Jews were beaten to 
death on the spot by their neighbours.  It is hard to see how someone who claims no longer 
to believe in a good, pure, true self which has been repressed by society can seriously sug-
gest that ‘the masses will discover a way of dealing with the problem of their enemies...  
methods of retribution which will range from punishment to re-education, without invol-
ving the form of the court which—in any case in our society, I don’t know about China—is 
to be avoided.’39 
 
                                                 
35 See Kate Soper, ‚Richard Rorty: Humanist and/or Anti-Humanist?‛ in Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues, 125. 
36 See Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, 237. 
37 Rorty, Take Care of Freedom, 30. 
38 Rorty, ‚Beyond Nietzsche and Marx,‛ 9. 
39 Ibid. The Foucault citation is from ‚On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists,‛ in Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 
28. Cf. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 196. 
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Since I am aware of the fact that some members of contemporary academia (especially Wes-
tern academia) do not find it self-evident why Stalinist or Maoist sympathies should be adjudi-
cated in the Rortyan sense (indeed, some may see Rorty’s views in this regard as themselves 
dangerously irresponsible) let me shed light on his stance by looking at it through sociological 
lenses provided by Neil Gross’ study Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher.40 
Gross’ main point is that understanding how Rorty was made (or made himself) a philosopher 
and an intellectual necessitates studying his family background, at least up to his famous ma-
ternal grandfather, Walter Rauschenbush.  In extension it is necessary to analyze the particular 
social roles undertaken by his parents.   
Obviously I do not have the time to even briefly summarize Gross’ findings here, but to 
cut a long story short, it needs to be stressed that Rorty’s parents, who were associated with 
‚the group that would become known as the New York intellectuals,‛41 became critical of 
Stalinism and Communism earlier than most of their colleagues on the Left (i.e., in the early 
30s).42  As Rorty himself describes it, he was ‚a red-diaper anticommunist baby,‛ and his 
childhood memories involved listening to his parents discussing the atrocities committed by 
Stalin, not to mention the fact that when he ‚was seven *he+ had the honor of serving little 
sandwiches< at a Halloween party‛ attended by such prominent anticommunist socialists as 
Sidney Hook.43  This should make it clearer why he eventually grew up a liberal who would 
squirm with revulsion at each positive mention of Stalin (or any other communist leader) and 
at each justification of terror in leftist politics.  Rorty’s anticommunism was in fact such an 
integral part of his identity that, however unfashionable it may have seemed to leftist 
intellectuals in the recent decades, he would never deny it, just as he was never ashamed of his 
intellectual pedigree.   
Another thing to which he openly confessed, a thing seemingly even more unfashio-
nable in the eyes of contemporary leftists, and which I mention here because it will allow us to 
contextualize what I have named the ‚psychological explanation,‛ is his attachment to pre-
cisely that tradition of Anglo-Saxon intellectuals which Nietzsche scornfully summed up with 
his well-known bon mot: ‚Man does not strive for happiness; only the Englishman does 
that.‛44  Rorty’s fellow-Anglo-Saxon intellectuals indeed think that human beings live for hap-
piness and they want to organize social life in a way that would allow as many different 
people as possible to pursue this goal by ‚smoothing out the rough edges of their incommen-
                                                 
40 See Neil Gross, Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008). Cf. Casey Nelson Blake, ‚Private Life and Public Commitment: From Walter Rauschen-
busch to Richard Rorty,‛ in John Pettegrew (ed.), A Pragmatist’s Progress?: Richard Rorty and American Intellec-
tual History (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 85-102. 
41 To be exact, they were situated ‚on the periphery of the group.‛ (Gross, Richard Rorty, 29) 
42 See Rorty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics, 59.  
43 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 58, 61.  As he also recalls: ‚as a teenage student at the University of Chicago, 
I had enjoyed a snotty sense of inherited superiority to fellow-students whose parents had waited until the 
Moscow trials to break with the American Communist Party. That was a whole five years later than my own 
parents, who had broken in 1932.‛ (Rorty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics, 59) 
44 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilights of the Idols, ‚Maxims and Arrows,‛ no. 12, in Twilight of the Idols; and The 
Anti-Christ, translated, with an introduction and commentary by R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Clas-
sics, 1990), 33. Cf. Rorty, Truth and Progress, 324. 
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surable claims.‛45  Of course, they realize that present liberal democracies are far from this 
ideal (there are many individuals whose attempts at happiness are constantly interrupted by 
the democratic society they live in), yet they think these democracies are nevertheless on the 
right track; that even though they need to be improved, they are still better, much better in-
deed, than any other system—both past and present.  What they are also aware of is that it is 
easy to stray from that road, and they thus prefer to tread very cautiously on it (this is what 
they themselves call ‚reformism‛ or ‚meliorism,‛ and what their detractors prefer to dub ‚a 
cowardly defense of the status quo‛46) remaining skeptical of any suggestions that we might 
translocate directly to a brave new world by means of some revolutionary gesture.  This is also 
why they think all radicalism, anything wildly heteroclite and extreme, should be confined to 
the private sphere and domesticated in such a way that the public realm will not begin to 
disintegrate.  For instance, and let me here cite a characteristically self-ironic (yet at the same 
time defiant) passage from Rorty’s review of James Miller’s The Passion of Michel Foucault:  
 
Americans whose first information about what happens in gay bathhouses comes from 
Miller’s book, and are intrigued to learn that ‚Once penetration has been achieved, internal 
massage coupled with in and out motions generates paroxysms of intense euphoria‛ (Geoff 
Mains, quoted in Miller’s book), will be inclined to wonder if perhaps we might not be able 
to get the same paroxysms in the comfort and convenience of our own homes.  Maybe an 
FDA-approved paroxysm pill?  An Underwriters’ Approved bedside widget for stimulating 
the relevant paroxysm-center in the brain?  This sort of reaction is why Americans often 
strike French intellectuals as just what Nietzsche had in mind when he described ‚the last 
men‛ as having ‚their little pleasures for the day and their little pleasures for the night.‛47 
 
This observation by Nietzsche brings us to the obvious truth that the features Rorty attributes 
to Anglo-Saxon intellectuals (the belief in happiness, the anxiety of radical changes, the attach-
ment to the private-public cleavage) are also the defining features of bourgeoisie, which Fou-
cault, as Rorty saw it, ‚hated‛ so much.  Yet if Miller’s book allowed him to identify in more 
detail the object of that scorn, it also helped Rorty locate its source in something deeper, 
                                                 
45 Rorty, ‚Paroxysms and Politcs,‛ 518. 
46 Cf. the following remark by Rorty: ‚I’m all for social changes, but I would prefer them to be reformist 
rather than revolutionary.‛ Rorty, Take Care of Freedom, 31. 
47 Rorty, ‚Paroxysms and Politics,‛ 515.  Of course, it is interesting to ask why the first thing that came to 
Rorty’s mind when he tried to imagine his fellow Americans’ reaction to learning about the pleasures of anal 
sex described in Miller’s book was a pill or a widget, i.e., something that allows one to feel the pleasure 
generated by this particular erotic corporeal activity without the need to engage in any such activity.  One way 
to begin to answer that question would be to indicate that sex did not figure prominently, if at all, in Rorty’s 
writings, and that neither did he show any interest in the poststructuralist conceptions of limit-experience, 
something which made American pragmatist Richard Shusterman describe him once as ‚product of Puritan 
America.‛  One can imagine that many a philosopher would be outraged by such a dictum. This was not the 
case with Rorty, though, who responded to it with his characteristic phlegm: ‚For better or for worse—perhaps 
because of being a product of puritan America, or perhaps because my views are indeed determined by ‘the 
intellectual field and consumerist world of late-capitalist liberalism’—Foucault’s, Bataille’s, and Deleuze’s 
discussions of the body leave me cold.‛ Richard Rorty, ‚Response to Richard Shusterman‛ in Richard Rorty: 
Critical Dialogues, 156.  See also James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). 
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darker, and more ‚idiosyncratic‛48 than an attempt to be fashionable in Parisian circles, or in 
the fact that French intellectuals simply are such curious creatures who, unlike the last men, 
‚want paroxysms where nobody should want them—in politics.‛  For Miller’s study:  
 
shows us how Foucault’s lifelong infatuation with death (an infatuation he shared with 
Sade, Poe and Baudelaire, but not, it is worth noting, with Nietzsche) came together with his 
experiences in California to produce, at least in the last ten years of his life, a belief that there 
is a kind of death-in-life which has nothing to do with happiness and which was, for him, 
‚thinkable‛ in a way that happiness was not.49 
 
This is exactly the reason why it is clear (for Rorty) that ‚we should not hope to get a new 
politics out of Foucault‛50—a phrase which should be read as meaning not only that Rorty 
simply cannot imagine a different aim of politics than happiness, but also that he believes that 
even if it were possible to imagine such a thing (something like ‚a kind of death-in-life,‛ for 
instance), it would nevertheless hardly constitute an advisable basis for any new political en-
deavor.  For, faithful to his pragmatist stance of ‚starting from where we are,‛ Rorty observes 
that we would still have to do something with all those for whom happiness is not only 
thinkable, but is the most important thing in life.  We would have to do politics with them, and 
to ‚begin‛ this job by showing utmost ‚contempt‛ for what they stand for would simply be 
absurd, especially that, however depressing this might have seemed to Foucault, they consti-
tute the majority in our societies.   
Yet Foucault wrote as if he was ready to just that.  He wrote, that is, ‚from a point of 
view light-years away from the problems of contemporary society,‛ wrote as its ‚dispas-
sionate observer< rather than its concerned critic.‛51  This is why, Rorty thinks, he avoided 
like a plague deploying in his discourse the kind of ‚we‛ that Rorty often used in his own 
writings and which is probably best epitomized by the following sentence: ‚We know that 
there must be a better way to do things than this; let us look for it together.‛52  This ‚dryness‛ 
                                                 
48 Rorty, ‚Response to Kate Soper,‛ 132. 
49 Rorty, ‚Paroxysms and Politics,‛ 517. Cf. the following exchange: ‚Josefina Ayerza: In this same article 
*i.e., ‚Paroxysms and Politics‛] you say that Foucault proposes something more exciting than happiness. 
Why not presume he’s invoking Freud’s concept in Beyond the Pleasure Principle?  Wouldn’t this so-called 
happiness concern the kind of satisfaction which makes for a bourgeois standard?  Richard Rorty: I think 
that he associated being bourgeois with being happy and distrusted. I’m not sure about the relation to 
Freud’s book, because I just don’t understand Freud’s book. I’ve never gotten a grip on what Freud had in 
mind when he talked about the death instinct.‛ (Ayerza with Rorty, ‚North Atlantic Thinking‛) Cf. also 
Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 139. 
50 Rorty, ‚Paroxysms and Politics,‛ 517. 
51 Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 173. 
52 Ibid. 174. Cf. Foucault’s response to this charge: ‚Richard Rorty points out that in these analyses I do not 
appeal to any ‘we’—to any of these ‘we’s’ whose consensus, whose values, whose traditions constitute the 
framework for a thought and define the conditions in which it can be validated.  But the problem is, pre-
cisely, to decide if it is actually suitable to place oneself within a ‘we’ in order to assert the principles one 
recognizes and the values one accepts; or if it is not, rather, necessary to make the future formation of a ‘we’ 
possible, by elaborating the question.  Because it seems to me that the ‘we’ must not be previous to the ques-
tion; it can only be the result—and a necessarily temporary result—of the question as it is posed in the new 
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of Foucault’s discourse (in the sense of that term that Rorty borrowed from Iris Murdoch),53 
was seen by Rorty (at least most of the times) as stemming exactly from Foucault’s inability to 
feel any commonality with his contemporaries.54   
In the ‚psychological‛ interpretation, then, Foucault looks contemptuously at liberal 
democracies from the standpoint of some further unspecified future world55 that knows no 
happiness and whose contours he caught a glimpse of (through a glass darkly, but never-
theless did) by dint of his experiences with sadomasochism and drugs.  However, in what I 
earlier termed the ‚historical‛ interpretation, such a look is directed at its object from the per-
spective of the past: a ‚pre-modern‛ reality in which human subjectivity had been supposedly 
freer than it has been for the last ‚several centuries.‛56  For Rorty, however, the latter perspec-
                                                                                                                                                                  
terms in which one formulates it.  For example, I’m not sure that at the time when I wrote the history of 
madness, there was a preexisting and receptive ‘we’ to which I would only have had to refer in order to 
write my book, and of which this book would have been the spontaneous expression.‛ (Michel Foucault, 
‚Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,‛ in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1984), 385)  Commenting on this passage, Marek Kwiek rightly asserted that ‚Rorty had no doubts< 
that the ‘we’ of liberals is quite satisfactory and there is no need of looking for another ‘we’ <in the manner 
of Foucault.‛ (Kwiek, Rorty’s Elective Affinities 213, 221)  Cf. David Hoy, ‚Rejoinder to Thomas McCarthy,‛ in 
David Couzens Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, Critical Theory (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 258-9. 
53 ‚It is a dryness produced by a lack of identification with any social context, and communication.‛ (Ibid. 
173)  Cf. another formulation of what Rorty meant by ‚dryness‛: ‚*Nietzsche+ and Kant, alas, shared some-
thing which each other that neither shared with Harriet Beecher Stowe—something that Iris Murdoch has 
called ‘dryness’ and Jacques Derrida called ‘phallogocentrism.’  The common element in the thought of both 
men was a desire for purity.  This sort of purity consists in not only being autonomous, but also in having 
the kind of self-conscious self-sufficiency which Sartre describes as the perfect synthesis of the in-itself and 
the for-itself.  This synthesis could be attained, Sartre pointed out, if one could rid oneself of everything stic-
ky, slimy, wet, sentimental, and womanish.‛ (Rorty, Truth and Progress, 283)  For a discussion of Rorty’s attri-
buting ‚dryness‛ to Foucault’s discourse, see also Hall, Richard Rorty, 198, and Allen, ‚After Knowledge and 
Liberty,‛ 79-80. 
54 Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 173. Cf. the following remark by Rorty: ‚The big difference between 
Foucault and Derrida is that Derrida is a sentimental, hopeful, romantically idealist writer.  Foucault, on the 
other hand, seems to be doing his best to have no social hope and no human feelings.  One cannot imagine 
Derrida hoping to write ‘so as to have no face’, any more than one can imagine Nietzsche doing so.  Despite 
his prediction that ‘the Book’ will be replaced by ‘the text’, Derrida intensely admires the great authors who 
stand behind the text he glosses; he has no doubts about his or her authorship.  Although he of course has 
doubts about metaphysical accounts of the nature of the self and of writing, he has no interest in dissolving 
the books in which great human imaginations have been most fully themselves into anonymous, rootless, 
free-floating ‘discourses.’  Whereas Foucault cultivates aloofness, Derrida throws himself into the arms of the 
texts he writes about.  Cynical detachment is not the whole story about Foucault, but it is an irreplaceable 
part of that story.‛  (Richard Rorty, ‚Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,‛ in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism (London: Routledge 1996), 13)  Note, however, that in his later article ‚Hope 
and Future,‛ Rorty describes both Derrida and Foucault as ‚specializ*ing+ in impossibility and hopelessness.‛ 
(Richard Rorty, ‚Hope and Future,‛ Peace Review, 14, no. 2 (2002), 152)  Cf. Rorty, Take Care of Freedom, 22. 
55 Cf. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 174. 
56 Rorty refers here to the following fragment of Foucault’s ‚The Subject and Power:‛ ‚<the political, ethical, 
social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the 
state’s institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is 
linked to the state.  We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through refusal of this kind of individu-
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tive is no more convincing than the former and he brushes it aside with a series of rhetorical 
questions: 
 
But what other kind of individuality did we have before those centuries?  The one we had 
when our subjectivity was shaped by the pre-literate village?  By the Athenian polis?  By the 
medieval church? 
 
And then adds: 
 
If Foucault thought that his historical research had revealed that in earlier times, before the 
state really got the hang of exercising bio-power we (who? everybody? a few lucky intellec-
tuals?) had a different, and really terrific, sort of subjectivity, he certainly failed to make 
clear just when and where this was so.57   
 
It is all too clear what lurks between these lines; the suggestion that despite all his ‚claptrap 
about repression‛58 and his political activities, etc., Foucault was in fact just another elitist 
thinker who was inclined to perceive any world that would be better merely for ‚<a few lucky 
intellectuals<‛ as generally better.   
Since we are on this subject, let me admit that when a moment ago, I mentioned Rorty’s 
fulminations against French intellectuals, I did not mention all the vices he attributes to that 
group.  For besides chastising them for being inexcusably susceptible to dangerous political 
fads and extremism, he also—which in the mouth of a professional philosopher such as Rorty 
may seem a rather paradoxical accusation—bemoaned their paying too much attention to phi-
losophy.  If I elided this accusation for now, this is because it constitutes an important aspect 
of Rorty’s interpretation of Foucault as rejecting all forms of social life.  This is the inter-
pretation to which we now turn.   
 
IV 
So, as we learn from Rorty, French intellectuals pay too much attention to philosophy, which is 
a result of the simple fact that ‚they read a lot of philosophy in high school, and are expected 
to take it pretty seriously.‛59  What could that mean and why would that be a bother in the 
first place?  Rorty tries to answer these questions by invoking one ‚of the most marked beha-
vioral differences between French and American intellectuals,‛ (i.e., those American intellec-
tuals who have not been seduced by French thinkers), which can be illustrated by the follo-
wing situation.60  Imagine someone provides you with a fairly convincing argument that the 
current ‚moral consensus rests upon a questionable philosophical assumption‛ or, horribile dic-
                                                                                                                                                                  
ality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.‛ (Michel Foucault, ‚The Subject and Power,‛ in 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, edited by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 216) 
57 Rorty, ‚Paroxysms and Politics,‛ 517. 
58 Rorty, ‚Foucault and Epistemology,‛ 47. 
59 Rorty, ‚Paroxysms and Politics,‛ 514. 
60 Ibid. 
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tu, that it lacks any such foundation at all.61  If you were an American intellectual of the sort 
described above, you would with all probability mumble something like ‚then so much the 
worse for philosophy,‛ in response, but if you were French, you would probably begin to 
think that the whole consensus is worthless, and maybe even start looking for ways to anni-
hilate it—preferably some extreme, sublime ways at that.62  
Now, according to Rorty, there are, basically, two things wrong with the French reac-
tion.  The first is that, seen from a meta-philosophical point of view, the question about the 
philosophical justification for a given moral consensus (or social order, or politics) and the 
question of whether this consensus (order, or politics) should actually be changed, belongs to 
two different registers.  These are the philosophical and political registers and must not be 
confused.63  The second, and more important, thing is that this kind of reasoning may lead us 
(and in fact have led such people as Nietzsche) to reject a fairly good social consensus, when 
we do not have anything better, or at least something concretely different, to offer in its place.64 
Foucault’s case is even worse than that since this line of thinking—twisted further by his 
relentless desire for the sublime—made him reject a priori every possible social consensus, or 
this is what Rorty says in his essay ‚Moral Identity and Private Autonomy: The Case of Fou-
cault.‛65 
To begin with, Rorty tells us, we must understand that Foucault belonged to a certain 
‚long-standing tradition in social philosophy< which, with Plato, sees society as Man writ large‛:  
 
Most philosophers in this tradition try to isolate some central, ahistorical, noncontingent 
core (e.g., ‚reason‛ or ‚a specifically moral motivation‛) within us, and to use the presence 
of this element within us as a justification for certain political arrangements, certain social 
institutions.66  
 
Some may object that this does not account for Foucault’s place in that tradition.  Was he not 
one of its most famous detractors, even according to Rorty himself? Yes and no.  To be more 
exact, according to the view Rorty holds in ‚Moral Identity and Private Autonomy,‛ while 
Foucault might have been the most famous of them, he still was not sufficiently consistent in 
his critique, which remained caught within the system of possibilities of the Platonic tra-
dition,67 thus making Foucault merely a perverted offspring thereof rather than its ultimate 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Cf. a different explanation of American intellectuals’ being philosophically unmusical: ‚A traditional 
difference between European and American intellectuals has been that the latter think that the moral and 
political decisions we face as individuals and as citizens are pretty clear and that the vocabulary in which 
typically formulate them does not need extensive revision. So they are slow to recognize the relevance of 
philosophy to politics, and inclined to think of philosophy as something you can take or leave alone—
something which need not be approached in a spirit of moral seriousness.‛ (Richard Rorty, ‚Response to 
Simon Critchley‛ in Mouffe (ed.), Deconstruction and Pragmatism, 45) 
63 Rorty, ‚Paroxysms and Politics,‛ 514. 
64 See Allen, ‚After Knowledge and Liberty,‛ 82. 
65 See Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 193-8. 
66 Ibid., 197. 
67 Barry Allen finds this interpretation ‚improbable.‛ (Allen, ‚After Knowledge and Liberty,‛ 80) 
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gravedigger.  What Rorty means is that while Foucault rightly denounced the idea of an ahis-
torical core to human beings (perceiving them instead as ‚contingent product*s+ of contin-
gently existing forces‛), he wrongly kept the connection between such a core and the justi-
fication of particular forms of social life, and ‚infer*red+ from the absence of [such a core]< 
the absence of the need for social institutions,‛ including those that are key to bourgeois libe-
ralism.68  
Yet the absence of the need for something does not necessarily entail its noxiousness, so 
we must still account for Foucault’s repudiation of all social institutions as ‚exerting norma-
lizing power,‛ and here the main culprit (for Rorty) is Foucault’s otherwise harmless yearning 
for sublimity; ‚the sublimity one attains by breaking out of some particular inheritance (a 
vocabulary, a tradition, a style) that one had feared might bound one’s entire life.‛69  ‚Other-
wise,‛ here refers to Rorty’s aforementioned belief that the desire for radical novelty is some-
thing acceptable (nay, commendable), only on the condition that it does not transcend the 
boundaries of the private, in the sense of our not trying to make the world we live in as flam-
boyant and unheard of as we rightfully want our own selves to become.  Foucault crossed that 
boundary and this was because, as Rorty suggests, his hypertrophic sense of sublimity con-
verged in him, by some unfortunate coincidence, with the aforementioned quasi-Platonism and 
with what I have described earlier as excessive trust in philosophy among French intellectuals.  
This is why ‚anarchism beg*an+ to seem attractive *to him+‛ and this is also why he eventually 
began to confuse two concepts of power.  The ‚descriptive‛ (which simply denotes our being 
shaped by the society that surrounds us, something which Dewey simply called ‚culture‛) and 
the ‚pejorative‛ (where power is something inherently repressive and alien to us that needs to 
be ‚shaken off our backs‛).  As a result, he used a ‚pejorative term like ‘discourse of power’ to 
describe the result of any social compromise, any political balancing act.‛70 
If this explanation of Foucault’s ‚anarchism‛ and rejection of bourgeois democracies 
seems too convoluted, then in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity Rorty provides a slightly sim-
pler (which does not mean more convincing) case, which, however, also hinges on attributing 
to Foucault a yearning for sublimity, a gullible faith that philosophy can instruct us whether a 
given sociopolitical structure is desirable or not, and on locating him within the Platonic 
tradition.  This time, however, Rorty depicts Foucault as believing in the inner ahistorical core 
of human beings and also in the idea (which ‚comes from Rousseau by way of Kant’s attempt 
to see a part of the self outside of nature‛) that this core is ‚ex definitione‛71 ‚deformed by ac-
culturation‛ and all possible ‚social institutions.‛72  From this perspective, in order for one to 
become fully autonomous, it will not suffice if one revolutionizes merely the way one lives in a 
society or even that society in particular.  What one will need is a ‚total revolution‛ that will 
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
69 Rorty, Truth and Progress, 324. Cf. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 193-4. 
70 Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, 196. 
71 Rorty, Truth and Progress, 321. 
72 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 64. See also Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 213n2; Rorty, 
Essays on Heidegger and Others, 182; and Rorty, Truth and Progress, 310. Cf. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 82. 
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sweep away social structures as such.73  This revolution will indeed have to be so total that it is 
barely thinkable (after all, everything you can think of now is necessarily mediated through 
the ‚socialization you have received‛), a conviction which leads Foucault to eventually 
producing Rorty’s ‚least favorite‛ sentence in the former’s entire corpus, namely: ‚I think that 
to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system.‛74 
Let me reiterate the lesson Rorty wants us to draw from each of the two interpretations.  
Namely, that combining philosophy and politics (in the sense of making our acceptance of a 
given social order, or any social order for that matter, conditional on what some grand philo-
sophical theories say on the nature of the self and society) is a ‚bad idea.‛75  Yet even if one 
does not accept Foucault’s ‚anarchism,‛ and even if one agrees with Rorty that it was his phi-
losophy that led Foucault to it, then one cannot not recognize that this philosophy led also to 
some undeniably positive political consequences.  What about GIP, for instance?  Is it not a 
brilliant example of combining philosophical and political activity for the good of society?  To 
Rorty’s mind, however, quite the opposite is true.  First of all, he sees what Foucault did for 
the cause of the prisoners as not having much to do with his philosophy, but rather with a 
non-philosophical desire to help the oppressed.  Foucault sometimes expressed this and it 
made him—at least in this respect—Rorty’s and Habermas’ fellow-liberal.76  Secondly, he ob-
serves that exactly at those moments when Foucault tried to make the idea of GIP sound 
philosophical (by asserting, e.g., that ‚the ultimate goals of its *GIP’s] interventions was not to 
extend the visiting rights of prisoners to thirty minutes or to procure flush toilets for the cells, 
but to question the social and moral distinctions between the innocent and the guilty,‛77) the 
whole project began to sound completely useless in sociopolitical terms.  After all, says Rorty, 
positioning himself again as a down-to-earth liberal immune to the lure of high theory:  
 
Prisoners need flush toilets for their cells more than anybody needs to question the dis-
tinction between the innocent consensual sado-masochists and the guilty non-consensual 
torturers, or the distinction between the guilty male rapist and his innocent female victim 
(or, for that matter, the distinction between dutiful policemen and those ecstatic left-wing 
academics at Vincennes, trying to crush the policemen’s heads).78 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 Rorty, Truth and Progress, 321. Rorty is strongly inspired here, as he himself admits, by Bernard Yack’s The 
Longing for Total Revolution: Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
74 Michel Foucault, ‚Revolutionary Action,‛ 230. 
75 Note, however, that Rorty is at least willing to admit, in another article, that ‚Foucault’s attempt to get 
philosophy and politics together is much more wary, complicated and generally intelligent than Sartre’s.‛ 
(Rorty, ‚Beyond Nietzsche and Marx,‛ 2)  
76 Foucault’s ‚own efforts at social reform (e.g., of prisons) seem to have no connection with his exhibition of 
the way in which the ‘humane’ approach to penal reform tied in with the needs of the modern state.‛ (Rorty, 
Essays on Heidegger and Others, 173) 
77 Michel Foucault, ‚Revolutionary Action: ‘Until Now’,‛ in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 227. 
78 Rorty, ‚Paroxysms and Politics,‛ 516. 
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V 
So these are the particular interpretations of Foucault’s politics that can be distilled from 
Rorty’s works, but while their divergence is interesting in itself, it would probably be more 
useful to explore why Rorty expended considerable energy criticizing Foucault in the first 
place.  In other words, why not apply to Rorty a similar hermeneutic strategy that he himself 
applied to Foucault, and ask: Why did Rorty ‚dislike‛ Foucault’s political thought so much 
and why did he so consistently manifest it?  If it was merely about Foucault’s contempt for 
Rorty’s beloved bourgeois liberalism, then there are plenty other important authors who 
expressed similar sentiments (or, rather, ‚resentments‛79), yet of whom Rorty did not say 
anything or relatively little (take Sartre, for example).  Does that not invite a psychological or a 
sociological (even vulgar) explanation?  Might it be that Rorty was driven in this regard by 
some fad or an idiosyncratic experience?  The answer is that it does invite such explanations, 
and Rorty in fact himself provided hints for this—hints that concern fads and idiosyncratic 
experiences indeed.   
As Barry Allen rightly pointed out, an important factor in Rorty’s approach to Foucault 
was that he considered him one of the patron saints of the ‚cultural Left‛; a certain dangerous 
fad, as he saw it, which has enjoyed preponderance in American leftist politics from the time 
of the Vietnam War, having supplanted the ‚Reformist Left‛ to which Rorty’s parents be-
longed and whose ideals he deeply cherished.80  Those ideals involved a belief in the emanci-
patory potential of liberal democracy (its American variant in particular) and a conviction that 
emancipation is best achieved by making gradual steps, such as introducing laws that would 
prevent ‚the rich from ripping off the poor.‛  Of these two ideals, the said belief was scorned, 
ridiculed, and rejected by the Cultural Left, while the conviction, itself not explicitly attacked, 
was replaced by the notion of emancipation as a struggle for cultural recognition.81  This latter 
maneuver by the Cultural Left can be explained by the fact that it was established by humani-
ties professors (most prominently, professors of literature), for whom, in the late sixties, a 
sense of ‚occupation alienation‛82 became so unbearable as to have led them to a kind of self-
deception, which consisted in the fantastic belief that by doing what they were professionally 
trained to do (studying all sorts of cultural artifacts that is) they could change the face of the 
extra-academic world.  Needless to say, Foucault proved a perfect object of emulation and this 
is also why, even though we owe the emergence of the Cultural Left’s principal theoretical 
platform, i.e. literary theory, to the influence on American scholars of both him and Jacques 
                                                 
79 Cf. Rorty, ‚Beyond Nietzsche and Marx,‛ 9. 
80 For Rorty’s discussion of the reformist and the cultural Left, see ‚The Eclipse of the Reformist Left‛ and ‚A 
Cultural Left‛ in Rorty, Achieving Our Country.  Cf. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 201 and Richard 
Rorty, Derek Nystrom, and Kent Puckett, Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies: A Conversation with Richard 
Rorty (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2002), 16.  Cf. Wojciech Małecki, ‚Ascetic Priests and O’Briens: 
Sadism and Masochism in Rorty’s Writings,‛ Angelaki: The Journal of Theoretical Humanities, no 3 (2009): 101-
15, and Allen, ‚After Knowledge and Liberty,‛ 68.  Cf. Richard Shusterman, Pragmatism and Cultural Politics: 
From Rortian Textualism to Somaesthetics, ‚New Literary History‛, no. 1 (2010): 69-94. 
81 See Rorty, ‚Is ‘Cultural Recognition’ a Useful Concept for Leftist Politics?,‛ passim. 
82 Frank Lentricchia’s term, appropriated by Rorty in Essays on Heidegger and Others, 133-6. Cf. Frank Len-
tricchia, Criticism and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 7. 
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Derrida, the former’s popularity quickly overshadowed the latter’s, opening the way for a 
transformation of literary theory into cultural studies,83 and to Foucault’s exerting his ‚dange-
rous influence‛ on that Left.84  
Admittedly, Foucault was not the only thinker whom Rorty held responsible for what 
he conceived as the sad condition of the Cultural Left (other culprits included, for instance, 
Paul de Man, Martin Heidegger, and Jacques Lacan), yet Rorty must have certainly thought 
Foucault’s blame was the most serious if he dubbed that formation the ‚Foucauldian Left.‛85 
What he meant by this was not merely the fact that ‚there’s a lot of trivialized Foucault doing 
the rounds in American intellectual circles, so that no matter what anybody says, there’s al-
ways some silly Foucaultian statement that’s in vogue: If you don’t mention ‘power,’ someone 
says, ‘Ah, but you’ve forgotten power,’ that kind of thing.‛86  He meant something much more 
weighty, which is perhaps best exemplified by the following angry and bitter indictment 
Rorty made in Achieving Our Country and reiterated obsessively in his other texts: 
 
The Foucauldian Left represents an unfortunate regression to the Marxist obsession with 
scientific rigor.87 This left still wants to put historical events in a theoretical context.  It 
                                                 
83 Or this is at least how Rorty sees it. Richard Rorty, ‚Looking Back at Literary Theory,‛ in  Haun Saussy 
(ed.), Comparative Literature in an Age of Globalization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 63. 
Cf. François Cusset, French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the 
United States, trans. Jeff Fort (Minneapolis-London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), especially Part II 
‚The Uses of Theory.‛ 
84 Rorty, Take Care of Freedom, 40. 
85 Admittedly, he called it also, after Harold Bloom, ‚the Nietzscheanized Left.‛ See Rorty, Philosophy and 
Social Hope, 133. 
86 Ayerza with Rorty, ‚North Atlantic Thinking.‛ 
87 If, as far as politics is concerned, Rorty’s least favorite passage in Foucault was ‚I think to imagine another 
system is to extend our participation in the present system,‛ then when it comes to methodology, it must 
have certainly been the following fragment from The Archeology of Knowledge, which, Rorty importantly 
conceived of as Foucault’s ‚stuffiest, most obscure and worst book‛ (Rorty, ‚Beyond Nietzsche and Marx,‛ 
7): ‚I have undertaken, then, to describe the relations between statements. I have been careful to accept as 
valid none of the unities that would normally present themselves to anyone embarking on such a task. I 
have decided to ignore no form of discontinuity, break, threshold, or limit.‛ Michel Foucault, The Archaeology 
of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 31; cited in Rorty, ‚Foucault and Epistemology,‛ 43.  According to 
Rorty ‚In such passages, Foucault writes like a contented inhabitant of the ‘system of possibilities’ offered by 
French academic philosophy, a system which forbids you just to settle for being clever enough to have found 
interesting new descriptions to replace boring old ones. Instead, it commands you to exhibit your discovery 
of such unities as the application of a rigorous method, an illustration of a general theory, the result of 
having adopted the right starting-point. Nevertheless, notions of ‘method’, ‘starting-point’ and ‘theory’ are, 
officially, anathema to Foucault.‛ (Rorty, ‚Foucault and Epistemology,‛ 43)  Alternatively, Rorty interprets 
Foucault’s celebration of ‚method‛ and ‚rigor‛ as a feature he shares with other post-Nietzschean anti-Pla-
tonists (e.g., ‚with Heidegger, Sartre, Gadamer, *and+ Derrida‛), and which distinguishes that group from 
‚post-Darwinian‛ American anti-Platonists. Namely: ‚The Europeans have typically put forward a distinc-
tive, new, post-Nietzschean ‘method’ for philosophers to employ.  Thus in early Heidegger and early Sartre 
we find talk of ‘phenomenological ontology’, in late Heidegger of something mysterious and wonderful cal-
led ‘Thinking’, in Gadamer of ‘hermeneutics’, in Foucault of ‘the archeology of knowledge’ and of ‘genea-
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exaggerates the importance of philosophy for politics, and wastes its energy on sophis-
ticated theoretical analyses of the significance of current events.  But Foucauldian theore-
tical sophistication is even more useless to leftist politics than was Engels’ dialectical mate-
rialism.  Engels at least had an eschatology.  Foucauldians do not even have that.  Because 
they regard liberal reformist initiatives as symptoms of a discredited liberal ‚humanism,‛ 
they have little interest in designing new social experiments< The Foucauldian academic 
Left in contemporary America is exactly the sort of Left that the oligarchy dreams of: a Left 
whose members are so busy unmasking the present that they have no time to discuss what 
laws need to be passed in order to create better future.‛88  
 
The fact that Rorty reiterated this accusation ‚obsessively‛ in different places, allows me to 
move, in conclusion, to the correctness of Rorty’s reading of Foucault, and Rorty’s herme-
neutic habits in general.  For as Rorty confessed in an essay self-ironically entitled ‚The Prag-
matist’s Progress,‛ he could never resist reading others through his obsessions, something 
which amounted to ‚imposing‛ a specific ‚grid‛ on a given author.89  One such obsession, 
which he mentions in that text, is the titular narrative of the Pragmatist’s Progress, i.e., the 
process of shaking off the shackles of foundationalist thinking and attaining a truly ironic con-
sciousness, while some others include the alleviation of human suffering and, yes, the decline 
of the Reformist Left and the rise of the cultural one.  Whereas the first of these obsessions led 
Rorty to interpret Foucault’s Pendulum90 as testifying to Umberto Eco’s alleged anti-essen-
                                                                                                                                                                  
logy’... By contrast, the Americans have not been much to such proclamations.‛ (Rorty, Philosophy and Social 
Hope, xx-xxi)  
88 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 139.  Cf. Allen, ‚After Knowledge and Liberty,‛ 81, where he refers to the 
same passage.  Cf. also Rorty’s remark that Foucault ‚reminds one of the conservative who pours cold water 
on hopes for reform, who affects to look at the problems of his fellow-citizens with the eye of the future 
historian.  Writing ‘the history of the present’, rather than suggestions about how our children might inhabit 
a better world in the future, gives up not just on the notion of human nature, and on that of ‘the subject’, but 
on our untheoretical sense of social solidarity.  It is as if thinkers like Foucault and Lyotard were so afraid of 
being caught up in one more metanarrative about the fortunes of ‘the subject’ that they cannot bring them-
selves to say ‘we’ long enough to identify with the culture of the generation to which they belong.‛ (Rorty, 
Essays on Heidegger and Others, 174)   Cf. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, 4. 
89 Rorty, ‚The Pragmatist’s Progress,‛ in Philosophy and Social Hope, 133. Cf. Małecki, ‚Ascetic Priests and 
O’Briens,‛ 101, 110. 
90 The Foucault in question is of course Léon, not Michel.  On the other hand, one certainly might interpret 
this title, and thus the novel, as alluding to Michel Foucault, even if this is not what Eco himself had inten-
ded: ‚my last novel is entitled Foucault’s Pendulum because the pendulum I am speaking of was invented by 
Léon Foucault.  If it were invented by Franklin the title would have been Franklin’s Pendulum.  This time I 
was aware from the very beginning that somebody could have smelled an allusion to Michel Foucault: my 
characters are obsessed by analogies and Foucault wrote on the paradigm of similarity.  As an empirical 
author I was not happy about such a possible connection.  It sounds like a joke and not a clever one, indeed. 
But the pendulum invented by Léon was the hero of my story and I could not change the title: thus I hoped 
that my Model Reader would not try to make a superficial connection with Michel.  I was to be disappoin-
ted; many smart readers did so.  The text is there, and maybe they are right: maybe I am responsible for a 
superficial joke; maybe the joke is not that superficial.  I do not know.  The whole affair is by now out of my 
control.‛ (Umberto Eco, ‚Between Author and Text,‛ in Umberto Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, 
ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 82-3)  
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tialism,91 the latter propelled Rorty to read Michel Foucault through the prism of his being 
idolized by the Cultural Left, i.e., to concentrate on those bits of Foucault’s work which served 
as a source of inspiration for that movement. 
Therefore, one might say that Rorty grappled with a certain construct of Foucault, pro-
minent in American academia, rather than the actual thinker.92  To take but two examples: 
How could Rorty describe Foucault as a radical anarchist who conceived power as ‚inherently 
repressive,‛ when the latter explicitly claimed that power is ‚not always‛ so and can even 
‚have results which are positive, valuable, interesting‛; not to mention his reiteration that he 
was concerned with ‚question*ing+ the relations of power in the most scrupulous and attentive 
manner possible, looking into all the domains of its exercise,‛ which is ‚not the same thing as 
constructing a mythology of power as the beast of the apocalypse‛?93  How could Rorty im-
pute to Foucault some rabid anti-liberalism and a desire to turn everyone into a seeker of limit-
experiences, when Foucault did not hesitate to state that ‚The only ethics you can have, with 
regard to the exercise of power, is the freedom of others,‛ and emphatically refused to play the 
role of a prophet (‚I don’t tell people, ‘Make love in this way, have children, go to work’‛94)?  
As should be clear from the present paper, Rorty was aware of such passages, and he 
even openly admitted in one place that as a matter of fact, Foucault is ‚better than‛ his 
Adornian-sounding judgment that ‚to imagine another system is to extend our participation in 
the present system‛ (and the other claims Rorty critiqued) ‚would suggest.‛95  Better, that is, 
because—in Rorty’s optic—apart from the bad Foucault, elevated on the altar of the Cultural 
Left, there existed a good Foucault, who seemed closer to Dewey and thus to Rorty himself.   
Now, leaving aside the issue whether this vision of Foucault’s fissured self is accurate,96 
the question remains why Rorty focused so prominently on what he took to be the bad Fou-
cault, while downplaying the good one, whose existence he apparently believed in?  The an-
swer is obviously related to Rorty’s obsession with the Cultural Left and can be found in 
exactly the same essay by Rorty where he admits that, on the whole, Foucault is ‚better than‛ 
his anarchistic remarks imply.  For this assessment is immediately followed by the reminder 
that ‚some‛ of Foucault’s ‚followers are a lot worse,‛ which clarifies that waging war on the 
bad Foucault, seemed to Rorty a much more urgent task than presenting a balanced account of 
this thinker, because it was precisely the bad Foucault who held the minds of many American 
intellectuals captive and changed the face of leftist politics in the US for the worse.  While, as 
                                                 
91 An impression that ‚evaporated‛ when he later ‚read Eco’s article ‘Intentio lectoris’.‛ (Ibid., 134) 
92 A judgment that is further bolstered by Rorty’s shifting in some of his texts between ‚Foucault,‛ ‚Fou-
cauldians,‛ and the ‚Foucauldian Left.‛ 
93 Michel Foucault, ‚Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual: An Interview with Michel Foucault con-
ducted by Michael Bess‛; http://www.vanderbilt.edu/historydept/michaelbess/Foucault%20Interview; acces-
sed 30 Nov 2010.  Importantly, Foucault himself adds that ‚Sometimes, because my position has not been 
made clear enough, people think I’m a sort of radical anarchist who has an absolute hatred of power. No!‛ 
(Ibid.) 
94 Ibid. 
95 Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, 129. 
96 For the view that it is not see Colin Koopman, ‚Revising Foucault: The History and Critique of Moder-
nity,‛ Philosophy and Social Criticism, 36, no. 5 (2010), 545-565. 
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we have seen, Rorty presented several different portrayals of the bad Foucault, it must finally 
be stressed that to his eyes each of these incarnations of the main patron saint of the Cultural 
Left looked equally dangerous and had to be exorcised.97  
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97 I would like to thank Colin Koopman for inviting me to contribute to the present issue of Foucault Studies 
and for his useful remarks on a previous draft of this paper.  Many thanks also to Professor Barry Allen, who 
provided me with his essay ‚After Knowledge and Liberty.‛ 
 
